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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. §782a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1994).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues presented for review are the following:
1.

Did the district court err in submitting the third-party attorney fees claim to

the jury under the facts of this case? This is a question of law, and is reviewed for
correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468,
471 (UtahApp. 1993).
2.

Did the district court err by giving confusing and contradictory instructions

to the jury? This issue is a question of law, and is reviewed for correctness. State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations
which are determinative of the issues appealed by Appellant Tolman. However, Rule 51,
Utah R. Civ. P., is applicable to the analysis of Tolman's issues.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.
In this case Plaintiff-Appellant R.C. Tolman and Plaintiff/Cross-Appellee Lava Bluff

Water Company, Inc. ("Lava Bluff") sued Defendant, Appellee and Cross-Appellant
Winchester Hills Water Company, Inc. ("WHWC") for damages for WHWC's use of Lava
Bluffs one-third ownership interest in the WHWC water system, and for damages for loss
of business due to WHWC's refusal to provide water service to Lava Bluffs residential
building lots in the Winchester Hills Subdivision area. The original complaint included
other causes of action, including claims against certain individuals (Record on Appeal,
hereinafter "R.," 1-15). However, those other claims were dismissed prior to trial yja either
stipulation or partial summary judgments and are not at issue on appeal.
Pursuant to stipulation, Plaintiff and Cross-Appellee Eaglebrook Corporation
("Eaglebrook") was joined as a party to the action. R. 121-22. WHWC counterclaimed for
return of Lava Bluffs one-third interest in its water system and for an adjudication that
Tolman was obligated to transfer 25 acre feet of water to WHWC under the terms of
certain agreements between Tolman and the other developer of the Winchester Hills
Subdivision area. WHWC also counterclaimed against Tolman for unauthorized use of
WHWC water and unpaid WHWC water-stock assessments, and for attorney fees from
Tolman resulting from its defense of Lava Bluffs claims. R. 378-395.
The parties' various causes were tried to a jury commencing on August 30, and
ending on September 3, 1993. (Trial Transcript, Vols. I-V, hereinafter "T.") At the close
of Lava Bluffs case the trial court granted WHWC's motion for a directed verdict on both
2

of Lava Bluffs claims. T. 631-39. At the close of WHWC's case the trial court granted,
in part, the directed verdict motions of Tolman, Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff ordering that
Tolman was not obligated to transfer 25 acre feet of water to WHWC. T. 780-82, 793-95.
Lava Bluff stipulated that it would reconvey the one-third interest in WHWC's water system
to Eaglebrook (T. 790), and the court imposed a constructive trust on Eaglebrook's title to
those assets for the benefit of WHWC while denying WHWC's request that the assets be
conveyed to it. T. 785-96. Instructions and a special verdict were submitted to the jury
asking it to find the amount of damages, if any, Tolman owed WHWC for his use of its
water and for his failure to pay water-stock assessments, and whether Tolman should be
responsible in damages to WHWC under the third-party attorney fee rule for breaching
fiduciary duties he owed WHWC which resulted in legal expenses to WHWC in defending
Lava Bluffs claims based upon its one-third ownership of the WHWC system and in
securing the return of 125 acre feet of water right which Tolman had transferred to his wife
and him from WHWC. R. 1310-13,1314-43.
The jury rendered its special verdict in favor of WHWC finding that Tolman had
breached fiduciary duties to WHWC by entering certain agreements which transferred
one-third of WHWC's water system to Eaglebrook and by transferring the 125 acre feet of
water right out of WHWC, and that Tolman was responsible to pay reasonable attorney
fees to WHWC as damages incurred in defending Lava Bluffs action against it based on
a claim of ownership in that one-third of WHWC's water system and in pursuing an action
against Tolman and his wife to secure return of the 125 acre feet of water. The jury also
awarded WHWC damage amounts on its claims against Tolman for water use and water3

stock assessments. See: Addendum 1, Special Verdict of the Jury, dated 3 September
1993, and Addendum 2, Judgment, entered 5 October 1993; R-1310-13,1354-62.
Tolman appeals the jury's finding of his responsibility for attorney-fee damages and
the trial court's subsequent judgment against him of $23,428 in favor of WHWC for the
fees claimed by its counsel. See: Addendum 3, Judgment and Award of Attorney's Fees,
entered 22 April 1994, R. 2009-30.
WHWC cross-appeals from the trial court's rulings that Tolman was not obligated
to provide 25 acre feet of water to WHWC, and that Eaglebrook would not be ordered to
convey to WHWC the one-third interest it holds in the water system but, instead, that a
constructive trust for the benefit of WHWC would be imposed on Eaglebrook's ownership
of those assets.

2.

Facts Relevant to Issues Presented for Review by Appellant Tolman.
In 1979 a group of individuals organized a Utah corporation they named Shad

Investment and Development Company ("Shad" or "SIDCO") to develop a subdivision in
Washington County, Utah, called Winchester Hills. (Trial Exhibits, hereinafter "Ex.," P-1.)
The following year, 1980, the same individuals organized Winchester Hills Water
Company, Inc. ("WHWC") as a non-profit, mutual water company to provide water service
to the Winchester Hills Subdivision area to be developed by SIDCO. Ex. P-4. In the mid1980s all but two of the original incorporator-developers separated from the companies
leaving Russell Walter and Plaintiff R. C. Tolman as the only owners, director-officers and
trustees of both corporations. T. 127-28.
4

By 1988 Tolman and Walter had decided to terminate their business relationship.
To accomplish their separation they agreed that SIDCO would transfer one-half of its
assets and liabilities to another Utah company, Eaglebrook Corporation, and that 100
percent of the stock of Eaglebrook would be transferred to Tolman. Tolman, in turn, would
surrender his SIDCO stock and Walter would own 100 percent of that company. T. 147197. As for their control of WHWC through SIDCO (T. 134-35, 582), they agreed the
assets comprising the Winchester Hills Subdivision's water production, storage and
delivery system-which had been constructed, and was owned, by SIDCO-would be
divided and assigned one-third to WHWC, one-third to SIDCO and one-third to
Eaglebrook. These agreements were memorialized in two writings: a Water Agreement,
dated January 19, 1989, and a comprehensive settlement Agreement executed on
February 25, 1989, the effective date of which was recited to be December 31, 1988.
Exs. P-14, P-15 and P-18.
At the time of the January 19 and February 25, 1989, agreements Tolman and
Walter were the sole officers and trustees of WHWC, and they controlled all its voting
stock through SIDCO. T. 134,138-39. Prior to that time no shares of water stock had
been issued to homeowners who bought Winchester Hills Subdivision lots from SIDCO.
T-136. Rather, SIDCO had entered into water user agreements with the homeowners
allowing them either 1,000 or 1,600 gallons per day of WHWC culinary water. T. 525. It
was the intent of Tolman and Walter in executing the January 19 and February 25,1989,
agreements which accomplished the third-third-third distribution of the subdivision water
system assets to safeguard the homeowners' use of WHWC water service and to protect
5

their own ability to develop and sell additional residential lots in the Winchester Hills
Subdivision's various platted phases. T. 172, 242, 529-30.
Almost immediately after signing the February 25, 1989, settlement Agreement
Tolman and Walter began disputing its meaning and implementation. T. 183. Tolman had
not signed the January 19, 1989, Water Agreement. Walter had taken it upon himself to
draft and execute that agreement on behalf of SIDCO and WHWC. T. 175, 288, 532. It
was not until two years later, in January 1991 in a lawsuit brought by SIDCO and Walter
against WHWC, Tolman, Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff, that it was established that the
January 19, 1989, Water Agreement had been executed in furtherance of their February
25, 1989, settlement Agreement and that it was binding upon Tolman and his company,
Eaglebrook. T. 183, 249, 391; R. 1597 (Exhibit "L") and Ex. D-59.
The post-agreement disputes between Tolman and Walter in 1989 led Tolman to
transfer 125 acre feet of water out of WHWC's name and into the names of his wife and
him, as joint tenants, in April of that year. Ex. D-65. He did this because Walter had
delayed transferring one-third of the water system assets from SIDCO to WHWC as the
February 25, 1989, settlement Agreement required. T. 360, 394, 542.
By the first of May 1989, an independent board of directors for WHWC had been
elected from among Winchester Hills Subdivision homeowners. T. 306. Prior to that time
the developers, Tolman and Walter, had functioned as WHWC's officers and directors.
T. 165, 309, 515. Finding themselves in the middle of the Tolman-Walter dispute, and
unable to satisfy state regulatory requirements either for exemption from regulation as a
mutual water company or for certification as a public utility as a result of WHWC's
6

fractional ownership of its water delivery system (T. 255), the new board of directors
imposed a moratorium on water hook-ups to WHWC's system. T. 360. This prevented
Toiman and Walters from selling any subdivision lots for which a building permit could be
obtained. T. 362. So, Walters, for his part, accomplished the transfer from SIDCO to
WHWC of the promised one-third of the water system assets (T. 255), and in July 1991
he entered into a separate agreement with WHWC which permitted him to complete the
development and sale of his Winchester Hills lots as contemplated under his separation
agreement with Toiman. T. 267, 345; Ex. P-26. Toiman, for his part, organized Lava Bluff
in July 1989 as a Utah corporation (T. 398, 547), and transferred Eaglebrook's one-third
interest in the WHWC water delivery system to that new entity. T. 550, 734. Toiman then
attempted to develop the Winchester Hills Subdivision lands which had been distributed
to him under the separation agreement with Walter by delivering water service to his lots
through Lava Bluff using the one-third interest in WHWC's system with his own Lava Bluff
system. T. 398-409, 548. However, the WHWC board of directors actively resisted him.
T. 355, 410.
WHWC sued Toiman and his wife to recover the 125 acre feet of water which
Toiman had conveyed out of WHWC in April 1989. WHWC was successful in that suit,
and in January 1990 the district court for Washington County, Utah, declared Tolman's
April 1989 water deed null and void. T. 360. The on-going dispute between Toiman and
Walter, and the attempts by Toiman to subdivide his lands in, and adjacent to, the
Winchester Hills Subdivision by providing water service through Lava Bluff, resulted in
other lawsuits. The Public Service Commission also held a hearing on competing
7

applications by WHWC and Lava Bluff to be the certificated public utility with the sole right
to provide water service to the Winchester Hills Subdivision area. Although the Public
Service Commission held that WHWC should be awarded that certificated responsibility,
the disputes between WHWC and Tolman continued. This lawsuit was eventually filed.
Tolman's issues on appeal center on the jury's finding that he was responsible to
pay the attorney fee expenses WHWC incurred in defending Lava Bluffs claim that
WHWC owed it for damages for using the one-third of WHWC's water system it owned.
The special verdict form submitted to the jury is Addendum 1. The special interrogatories
in that verdict on the third-party attorney fees issues are No. 7 (related to the one-third
division of the WHWC water system) and No. 8 (related to Tolman's deed of the 125 acre
feet of water). The instructions given to the jury regarding the findings to be answered for
those attorney-fee issues were Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16. R. 1329-32; Addendum 4. The
jury sent a written question to the judge which read: "We are having a hard time
understanding number three on Instruction No. 16. Will you please clarify what is meant
by it." Court's Exhibit No. 3. The judge responded as follows:
Instruction No. 16 is the instruction on damages for breach of
fiduciary duty relating to the claim of Winchester Hills Water
company against Mr. Tolman for signing the April 19th, 1989
deed. And your question is regarding number three, that Mrs.
Arleen Tolman was not connected with Mr. Tolman's signing
the April 19, 1989 deed.
This is a statement of the law in this matter, and I -my
obligation is to give you the law. It's your obligation to find the
facts in the matter and to apply the law to the facts as you find
them and come up with a verdict. I can't clarify it any more
than that. It's a factual question which you're going to have to
determine. And that question is simply whether or not Mrs.
8

Tolman was somehow connected with the act of Mr. Tolman in
signing the April 19,1989 deed, which contained the language
attempting to transfer some water rights from the water
company.
T. 848.
Although the jury found Mrs. Tolman was not connected to her husband's act of
signing the water deed, that is, that she was a third party, and answered special
interrogatory No. 8 'Yes," the trial court set that finding aside at the subsequent bench
hearing on the amount of attorney fees to be awarded WHWC.

Hearing Transcript

(Judge's Ruling Only), March 4,1994, pp. 7-8.
The record shows that Lava Bluff was not a third person in the sense contemplated
by the third-party attorney fee rule. Lava Bluff was owned and controlled by Tolman, and
he considered Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff as "principle companies of myself." T. 538, 547,
549'50

WHWC's first independent president, Don Reusch, referred to Lava Bluff as

'Tolman." T. 349. Reusch testified it was his understanding that Tolman owned all of the
Lava Bluff corporation and in his mind Tolman was operating as Lava Bluff "personally."
T. 750. Reusch had been president of WHWC during the time it encountered the majority
of its problems with Tolman. The manager of the compliance and water section of the
Utah State Division of Public Utilities, Ralph Creer, referred to Lava Bluff and Tolman
interchangeably in describing their activities in the Winchester Hills Subdivision area. T.
442-43. A recent WHWC board member, Lee Chugg, testified that WHWC had been
unable to get insurance because it lacked title to one-third of its water system which
Tolman "owns." T. 773.

9

Also, the one-third interest in the water system held in Lava Bluffs name when this
lawsuit commenced was conveyed to it by Tolman from his wholly-owned company,
Eaglebrook. T. 734. Eaglebrook had acquired title to those assets from SIDCO when
Tolman and Walter separated (T. 196-97, 502, 523; Exhibit P-15, page 3, sub-fl 9), and
Walter referred to Eaglebrook as 'Tolman." T. 246-662. In support of a partial summary
judgment motion in this action, WHWC argued that each of the Plaintiffs, including Lava
Bluff, was bound by a ruling in an earlier lawsuit concerning the enforceability of the
January 19,1989, Water Agreement against Eaglebrook because they were in privity with
Eaglebrook. R. 448-49,451-59. The court below granted the motion, ruling that WHWC
could enforce the provisions of the January 19 and February 25, 1989 agreements against
the Plaintiffs, including Lava Bluff, by reason of collateral estoppel. R. 1551-53.

10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant Tolman contends the trial court erred in submitting WHWC's claim for an
award of attorney fees against him to the jury on the basis of the third-party attorney fees
rule. Tolman asserts that the record facts demonstrate that he was not a third person in
the context of the action brought against WHWC by Lava Bluff. Rather, he was sufficiently
in control of Lava Bluff and connected to it—both factually and in the law's contemplationthat an identity of interest and legal status existed between Lava Bluff and him. Tolman
urges the Court to recognize that a privity analysis is appropriate in determining whether
a litigant is a third person for purposes of applying the third-party attorney fees rule.
Viewed from that perspective, Tolman contends the record shows Lava Bluff was not a
third party to the contracts and transactions surrounding the division of water system
assets in question out of which the litigation against WHWC eventually arose. The trial
court recognized the unique legal nature of the relationships which resulted from the
contracts by which Tolman's company, Eaglebrook, obtained title to the water system
assets and the legal consequence of Eaglebrook's assignment of those assets to Lava
Bluff by imposing a constructive trust upon those assets for the benefit of WHWC. Both
factually and legally, Lava Bluff was Tolman in the context of this lawsuit.
The trial court's jury instructions on the third-party attorney fee rule failed to
enlighten the jury regarding their tasks and, in fact, confronted them with unnecessary
problems. The instructions contradicted both the finding of the court and the argument of
Defendant WHWC that Tolman was one with both Lava Bluff and Eaglebrook by
suggesting that Lava Bluff might not be "connected with" Mr. Tolman. Further, by i equiring
11

specific findings which are logically incompatible with one another, but which all must exist
together in order to apply the third-party attorney fee rule in this case, one of the
instructions invites an illogical and incorrect application of that rule to the facts of the case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
BY SUBMITTING THE THIRD-PARTY
ATTORNEY FEES CLAIM
TO THE JURY.
As an exception to the general rule that a party may not recover attorney fees in the
absence of a statutory or contractual provision, Utah recognizes the "third-party tort rule."
In South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack. 765 P.2d 1279,1282 (Utah App. 1988), this exception was
recognized to have application when
[T]he natural consequence of one's negligence is another's
involvement in a dispute with a third party, attorney fees
reasonably incurred in resolving the dispute are recoverable
from the negligent party as an element of damages.
This Court cited Washington state case law in the South Sanpitch opinion as an
example of the restatement, above, of the third-party attorney fees rule. Jd. at 1282. In
this case WHWC quoted a Washington state appellate court's formulation of the thirdparty rule in support of its argument that a claim against Tolman for attorney fees was
justified by the evidence. R. 301-04. That case is Morgan v. Roller. 794 P.2d 1313,1315
(Wash. Ct. App. 1990), and its formulation of the rule was:
[A] wrongful act or omission of A . . . toward B . . . ; such act or
omission exposes or involves B in litigation with C ...; and C

12

was not connected with the original wrongful act or omission
A toward B.
The court below adopted this formulation of the third-party attorney fee rule in
fashioning Instruction No. 15 which was given to the jury. See: Addendum No. 4, R.
1331. Tolman's trial counsel took exception to this instruction, asserting that the thirdparty attorney fee rule had no application under the facts of this case. T. 799-800. Tolman
contends on appeal that the trial court erred as a matter of law by instructing the jury as
it did in Instruction No. 15 because the facts clearly demonstrate that Lava Bluff was not
a third person in the legal sense contemplated by third-party attorney fee rule. This follows
when considered in the context of the facts surrounding Tolman's acquisition of the onethird interest in the Winchester Hills water system and his transfer of that one-third interest
to Eaglebrook and, in turn, to Lava Bluff.
Referring, again, to Washington case law, the Supreme Court of that state explaining the third-party exception to the general rule that attorney fees are not allowed
in the absence of contract or statute-has held as follows:
In those actions, where the acts or omissions of a party to an
agreement or event have exposed one to litigation by third
persons—that is, to suit by persons not connected with the
initial transaction or event-the allowance of attorney's fees
may be a proper element of consequential damages. . . .
[citation omitted] We said this again in Wells v. Aetna Ins.
Co.. 60 Wash. 2d. 880, 376 .2d 644, with the statement:
These cases hold that when the natural and
proximate consequences of a wrongful act by
defendant involve plaintiff in litigation with
others, there may, as a general rule, be a
recovery of damages for the reasonable

13

expenses incurred in the litigation, including
compensation for attorneys fees.'
The fulcrum upon which the rule balances, then, is whether the
action, for which attorney's fees are claimed as consequential
damages, is brought or defended bv third persons-that is.
persons not privy to the contract, agreement or events through
which the litigation arises.
Armstrong Construction Company v. Thomson.
390 P.2d 976, 979-80 (Wash. 1964)(emphasis added).
Lava Bluff was either in privity with, or so closely interconnected to, the legal and
contractual obligations of Tolman regarding the creation of the one-third share of WHWC's
water system assets under the January 19 and February 25,1989 agreements that Lava
Bluff was not a "third person" for purposes of a third-party attorney fees rule analysis. As
a successor-in-interest to the same property rights which were transferred from SIDCO to
Eaglebrookfor the benefit and use of Tolman, Lava Bluff was in privity of estate with the
original contracting parties (namely, WHWC, SIDCO, Walter and Tolman) with regard to
the events through which this litigation eventually arose.
In Searle Bros, v. Searle. 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978), our Supreme Court
stated:
The legal definition of a person in privity with another, is a
person so identified in interest with another that he represents
the same legal right. This includes a mutual or successive
relationship to rights in property, [citing Taylor v. Barker. 70
Utah 534, 262 P. 266 (1927)].
In this case it is clear that Tolman, through the entities Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff
which he owned and controlled, created a mutual and successive relationship to rights in
the same property, namely, the one-third interest in the Winchester Hills Subdivision water

14

system transferred from SIDCO pursuant to his separation agreements with Russell
Walter. The trial court recognized this unique contractual and legal relationship when it
ruled that the one-third interest was held in constructive trust for WHWC by virtue of the
January 19 and February 25, 1989 contracts. Although Lava Bluff wasn't "part of the
contract[s]," the court viewed Lava Bluff as holding the one-third interest under the terms
of the contracts.1 T. 790-91.

It would follow that Lava Bluff was so identified in interest

with Tolman that its title to the one-third of the water system represented Tolman's legal
right in the contemplation of the law. Therefore, Lava Bluff was not a third party.
When analyzed from a factual viewpoint, the same conclusion is justified. Walter
testified that "Eaglebrook" was Mr. Tolman. The first independent president of WHWC
elected in May 1989, Don Reusch, who was involved in the majority of the problems the
water had encountered with Tolman, referred to Lava Bluff as 'Tolman." He testified it was
his impression that Tolman owned all of the corporations (Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff) and
in his mind "he [Tolman] was operating [Lava Bluff] personally." Other witnesses to the
Tolman-WHWC-Walter disputes had the same understanding of Lava Bluffs identification
with Tolman, for example: Ralph Creer, the manager of the compliance and water section
of the Utah Division of Public Utilities, described Lava Bluff and Tolman interchangeably,
and Lee Chugg, a WHWC board member, explained that the water board had encountered
insurance problems because it lacked the one-third interest in the water system that
Tolman "owns." This testimony establishes beyond peradventure that those who dealt with
1

Generally, a party in a fiduciary or confidential relationship cannot assign
contract rights or obligations without the express consent of the other party. 6 Am Jur
2d, "Assignments," §11, p. 196. The trial court's ruling acknowledged this principle.
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Tolman understood Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff were entities which he owned and
controlled, and that through them Tolman conducted his business affairs related to the
one-third interest in the WHWC water system assets which he had obtained from SIDCO
pursuant to the February 25,1989, separation Agreement with Walter. Accordingly, those
corporations were so clearly identified with Tolman that this Court should recognize that
Lava Bluff was not a true "third person" but, rather, was Tolman for purposes of analyzing
the third-party attorney fee rule. As Tolman testified, "Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff are
principal companies of myself." Therefore, under the law and facts of this case it was
error for the trial court to submit the third-party attorney fees instruction to the jury as the
basis for an award of damages against Tolman. Significantly, Tolman's argument on this
point is supported by a motion WHWC made in this case. On April 7,1992, WHWC filed
a motion for partial summary judgment against Plaintiffs Tolman, Eaglebrook and Lava
Bluff seeking a declaration that the terms of the January 19 and February 25, 1989
agreements could be imposed on each of them as a consequence of a ruling in a prior
lawsuit in the same state district court, referred to as Litigation #2.2 R. 448-49,451-59.
In Litigation #2 the court had ruled that the Water Agreement of January 19,1989,
had been executed by Russell Walter for SIDCO and WHWC in furtherance of the
comprehensive settlement Agreement signed by SIDCO, Walter, Tolman and Eaglebrook
2

Shad Investment and Development Corporation, a Utah corporation and Walter
and Associates, a Utah corporation, and Russell J. Walter, an individual, Plaintiffs v. R.
C. Tolman, an individual, Arleen Tolman his wife, R. C. Tolman Construction Company,
Inc., a corporation, Eagle Brook [sic] Corporation, a corporation, Lava Bluff Water
Company, a corporation, Winchester Hills Water Company, a Utah Corporation,
Defendants, in the Fifth District Court for Washington County, Utah, civil action No. 892863
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on February 25 1989, and that the Water Agreement was binding upon, and inured to the
benefit of, SIDCO and Eaglebrook. R. 1597 (Exhibit "L," 3-ring binder, and also cited as
Exhibit 11 in Exhibit A to WHWC's Request for Judicial Notice of Court Files Pursuant to
Rule 201 U.R.E. filed in support of its partial summary judgment motion. R. 460-62.) In
WHWC's memorandum supporting its motion for partial summary judgment, it argued that
Tolman, Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff had "been directly related to, or in privity with, the
litigants in [Litigation # 2 ] . . . ." R. 452. Lava Bluff was named as a party-defendant in
Litigation #2, but the order in that case, as it pertained to the enforceability of the January
19, 1989 agreement, did not mention Lava Bluff, but only referred to Eaglebrook.
Therefore, WHWC's partial summary judgment motion sought to tie the contractual knot
against Tolman and his companies once and for all by imposing that prior judicial
declaration on Lava Bluff. The court below agreed with WHWC's analysis and argument,
and in granting the summary judgment sought by WHWC, ruled in part:
IT IS ALSO ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED
that by reason of collateral estoppel Defendant Winchester
Hills Water Company can enforce the provisions of the
January 19, 1989 water agreement and February 25, 1989
comprehensive settlement agreement against the Plaintiffs
[Tolman, Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff]
R. 1552
Accordingly, WHWC has previously made the same case for privity between Lava
Bluff and Tolman-or "connectedness" to use the Washington state court's term employed
in the trial court's jury instructions-as Tolman now makes in support of his argument that
the third-party attorney fees rule should not have been applied against him.
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POINT 2
BY GIVING CONFUSING AND CONTRADICTORY
INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY ON THE THIRD-PARTY
ATTORNEY FEE RULE, THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR.
1.

Utah Courts' Standard for Appellate Review of a Trial Court's Jury Instructions:
Likelihood of Jury Confusion and Possibility of Different Verdict Absent Confusion.
In civil cases based on the common law, such as the present case, Utah's appellate

courts have reversed and remanded judgments on jury verdicts on the basis that unclear
or confusing jury instructions had prejudiced a party. In such circumstances, prejudice has
been found where there is a showing that the jury was probably confused by the
instructions it received and might have returned a different verdict had it not been
confused. Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hospital. 830 P.2d 270 (Utah 1992), discusses this
legal standard.
In Nielsen, plaintiffs bridge work was broken while she was in knee surgery. In her
action against the hospital and the physician, plaintiff advanced the theories of common
law negligence and £§£ ipsa loquitur. At trial, the jury returned a verdict of no cause of
action, and on appeal the Supreme Court remanded for a new trial because the jury
instructions were not adequately clear. The instruction on the £gs_ ipsa loquitur theory
allowed for rebuttable inference of negligence if the elements of iss. ipsa loquitur were
found. The instructions on negligence were stock instructions that suggested a finding of
negligence depends on whether the standard of care has been met, so that negligence
cannot be deduced from the fact of adverse outcome of surgery or complications attendant
to surgery.
18

In Nielsen, the trial court had not specified that some of the instructions applied to
the first theory and others to the second theory. Defendant argued that the language of
the instructions gave the jury ample information on which to figure out the distinction
between the two theories, but the Supreme Court rejected this argument on the basis that
the instructions as a whole reinforced the erroneous notion that the two theories could be
susceptible to the same analysis.
We are not convinced . . . that lay jurors would be able to
distinguish between these rather involved negligence theories
and instructions simply by noting this one phrase [adverse
results "in and of themselves" do not prove negligence].
While lawyers and judges with a background in negligence law
may be able to discern which instructions apply to which
theories, we are not satisfied that a lay jury could do so. We
can only conclude that a potential for confusion was created.
The confusion created by these instructions may well
have denied Nielsen a fair trial. "What the party is entitled to
is a fair presentation of the case to the jury under instructions
that clearly, concisely and accurately state the issues and the
law applicable thereto so that the jury will understand its
duties. Hanks v. Christensen. 11 Utah 2d 8,12, 354 P.2d 564,
566 (1960); see Wellman v. Noble. 12 Utah 2d 350, 352, 366
P.2d 701, 702 (1961). Admittedly, the two separate theories
of negligence complicated this case. Thus, special effort to
simply and clarify the instructions was essential. This effort
was lacking, and the instructions were consequently confusing
and may well have prejudiced Nielsen's res ipsa loquitur case.
. . . We view the potential for confusion here to have been
substantial, and therefore conclude that the error was
prejudicial in that there is a reasonable likelihood that the
jury's verdict may have been different absent the error.
Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-Dav Saints Hospital. 10 Utah 2d
94, 100, 348 P.2d 935, 938 (1960).
830 P.2d at 274-275.
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Under Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an appellate court usually does not
review the trial court's jury instructions in the absence of a distinctly stated objection made
before they are given. However, Rule 51 also provides that even if there is no objection
to a jury instruction at the trial level, "the appellate court, in its discretion and in the
interests of justice, may review the giving of or failure to give an instruction." Nielsen cites
Rule 51 and demonstrates that it is appropriate for an appellate court to exercise such
discretion where, as here, the potential for jury confusion about the trial court's instructions
is substantial and there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury's verdict may have been
different absent the confusion. The Nielsen court reversed and remanded because it
concluded that the error of allowing such confusion is prejudicial.
Last year this Court followed the same reasoning in Bradv v. Gibb. 886 P. 2d 104
(Utah App. 1994), to reach the same conclusion about similarly unclear jury instructions.
The Brady court also reversed and remanded because "[t]he trial court erred by giving
contradictory and potentially confusing jury instructions." 886 P.2d at 107.
2.

|p the Instant Case, the Potential for Confusion Arising from the Jury Instructions
on the Third-Party Attorney Fee Award Rule was Extremely High.
A.

The trial court's jury instructions failed to enlighten the jury.
In Wellman v. Noble. 366 P.2d 701, 702 (Utah 1961), our Supreme Court

explained that the "real inquiry" on error relative to jury instructions is "were the issues of
fact necessary to be determined, and the principles of law applicable thereto, correctly
presented to the jury in a clear and understandable manner?"3 By analogy, the question
3

The Court reemphasized this concept some four years later: 'The object of jury
instructions is to enlighten the jury on their problems. Instructions should fit the facts
20

in the present case must be: "Was the legal concept of privity among business entities
holding the same successive property interests under common contracts explained in the
jury instructions with sufficient clarity to allow the jury to apply the concept correctly to the
relevant facts? Did the jury fully comprehend the relationship between Lava Bluff and
Tolman, and did the trial court's instructions adequately equip the jury to determine
accurately whether that relationship resulted in Lava Bluff status as a third party, so the
third-party attorney fee rule might be considered applicable in this situation?" As detailed
below, the trial court's jury instructions did not accomplish these objectives.
The Nielsen court noted that "jury instructions are to be read as a whole," 830 P.2d
at 274, citing Startin v. Madsen. 120 Utah 631, 635, 237 P.2d 834, 838 (1951), and
considered the relationship among relevant instructions as well as the content of each.
In the present case, the trial court's jury instructions relevant to the third-party attorney fee
rule were Nos. 13,14,15 and 16. Addendum 4. These instructions defined and applied
the terms fiduciary,fiduciaryrelationship, and fiduciary relationship of corporate officers
and directors (Instructions No. 13 and No. 14). They did not provide the jury with any
guidance as to the legal concepts of "connectedness" or "privity" which would allow them
to determine whether Lava Bluff was sufficiently distinguishable from Tolman for purposes
of the third-party attorney fee rule to permit them to correctly answer "Yes" to the special
interrogatory put to them on that issue. It was necessary for the jury to understand the

shown, making them as clear in meaning and concise as possible in lay people's
language . . . ." Johnson v. Cornwall Warehouse Co., 16 Utah 2d 186, 398 P.2d 24,
25 (Utah 1965).
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privity relationship, as distinct from the fiduciary relationship,4 and the trial court's
instructions to the jury made no effort to enlighten the jury on this critical distinction.
B.

The trial court's jury instructions caused confusion.
Not only did Instructions Nos. 13,14,15 and 16 fail to enlighten the jury, they

contributed to its confusion. The jury instructions and special interrogatories did not focus
on the relevant legal concept of privity, but rather on an undefined "connection" among
corporate and natural persons. The jury specifically expressed its confusion as to the
meaning of the concept of "connectedness" by inquiring of the trial court as to the meaning
of paragraph 3 in Instruction No. 16 dealing with Mrs. Tolman. Additionally explanatory
instructions should have been given to guide the jury in determining whether the third-party
attorney fee rule could be applied to award WHWC its fees incurred in the prior litigation
against Tolman's wife. The special interrogatory required the jury to find that Mrs. Tolman
was "not connected with" Tolman's signing of a deed in April of 1989 in order to award
WHWC its fees. The jury did make such a finding, but at the subsequent hearing on
attorney fees the trial court overturned their verdict on the issue, ruling that Tolman and
his wife were too "interrelated" for such an award to be proper.

4

E.g., a fiduciary remains an entity separate from those to whom the fiduciary
duty is owed; indeed, it is not uncommon for a fiduciary to be subject to legal action
brought by those to whom the fiduciary duty is owed for any breach of that duty. Their
business interests and objectives are not necessarily one and the same. In contrast,
entities whose successive interests in property are one and the same (not parallel, not
similar, but literally the same) are intrinsically incapable of such independent
conduct as would render them different parties in an action relative to such property.
As the Nielsen Court pointed out relative to the difference between res ipsa loquitur
and common law negligence, this is wery likely a distinction a lay jury could not be
expected to make without adequate explanation.
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The record below indicates that the jury misinterpreted the concept of
"connectedness" as the term is used in Instruction No. 15 as well. The record shows
repeated references to Lava Bluff as one and the same with Tolman. WHWC itself had
argued in support of a partial summary judgment motion in this action that Plaintiffs
Tolman, Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff were in privity with one another in the law's
contemplation. Specifically, WHWC argued that Lava Bluff, together with Eaglebrook and
Tolman, should be bound by the ruling in an earlier lawsuit which enforced the January
19, 1989 Water Agreement against Eaglebrook. The trial court endorsed the argument
that Tolman, Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff were one and the same by granting WHWC's
motion on the basis that all three were collaterally estopped from relitigating the prior
ruling.
Notwithstanding its own concurrence in the position that Lava Bluff was in privity
with Mr. Tolman, the trial court instructed the j u r y , " . . . before you can find Mr. Tolman
liable to pay Winchester Hills Water Company's reasonable attorney fees, you must find
. . . [t]hat Lava Bluffs [sic] Water Company was not connected with Mr. Tolman's original
breach of fiduciary duty." As a matter of reason and logic, the jury could not have
considered Tolman and Lava Bluff to be one in interest and at the same time "not
connected with" one another.
Their determination that Mr. Tolman was "not connected with" Lava Bluff Water
Company-an entity he created, owned and controlled, which was referred to repeatedly
on the record as one and the same with Tolman-suggests that they were equally as
confused by the term "connected with" appearing in Instruction No. 15 as in Instruction No.
23

16. Viewed as a whole, the trial court's jury instructions on the third-party attorney fee rule
were highly likely to confuse the jury, both by the combination of information they gave and
relied on and by the information and distinctions they failed to articulate.
C.

The trial court's Jury Instruction No. 15 was internally inconsistent.
The third paragraph of Instruction No. 15 requires the jury to find that Lava

Bluff was "not connected with" Tolman's original breach of fiduciary duty in order for them
to find Tolman liable to pay WHWC's attorney fees incurred in defending Lava Bluffs
lawsuit. Any such breach, incident to Tolman's transfer of one-third of SIDCO's water
system assets to Eaglebrook, would have been under the terms of the February 25, 1989
separation Agreement Tolman entered into with Walter. If Lava Bluff was "not connected
with" Tolman at that time, it could only have been because Lava Bluff did not exist then:
it was created in July 1989. However, the first two paragraphs of Instruction No. 15
suggest that from the alleged breach of fiduciary duty by Tolman, Lava Bluffs action
against Winchester Hills was foreseeable. It is intrinsically impossible to foresee an action
being brought by an entity that does not exist.
The jury could not have been anything but confused by Instruction No. 15.

If

Tolman breached before Lava Bluff was created, then it may be possible to conclude thatat that time-Lava Bluff was "not connected with" Tolman. But it is not also possible to
conclude that-at that time-Lava Bluffs claim was foreseeable and resulted from the
breach.
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3.

The Inadequacy of the Jury Instruction Concerning the Third-Party Attorney Fee
Rule was Prejudicial to Tolman.
Where, as here, instructions potentially create confusion of the jury, and the jury's

verdict could have been different had the instructions been thorough and clear, legal
precedent in Utah is to reverse the trial court's judgment on the jury's verdict and remand
for renewed proceedings on the issue. This precedent should be followed in the instant
case.
The jury requested further explanation of the phrase "connected with" as it was
used in Instruction No. 16 concerning the applicability of the third-party attorney fee rule
to Mrs. Tolman. The jury had also been presented with the same phrase in Instruction No.
15 concerning the applicability of the third-party attorney fee rule to Mr. Tolman without
any more clarification of its meaning in that context than in Instruction No. 16. If the trial
court's instructions to the jury on the third-party attorney fee rule had clarified rather than
obscured this concept, the jury could have seen that Lava Bluff was never a party separate
from Tolman. Therefore, Lava Bluff could not have been a "third party" within the meaning
of the third-party attorney fee rule at any time. Had the jury understood that Lava Bluff was
not, and could not have been, a third party for this purpose, it would have returned a
different verdict on the issue of attorney fees in this case.
In the instant case, as in Nielsen, supra, the potential for confusion was substantial,
and the trial court's error in providing contradictory and internally inconsistent instruction
to the jury on the third-party attorney fee rule was prejudicial. There is at least a
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reasonable likelihood that the jury's verdict would have been different absent that error.
CONCLUSION
As a matter of law, the jury's special verdict finding Tolman responsible to pay
WHWC's attorney fees incurred in defending Lava Bluffs claims, and the court's judgment
against him for $23,428, should be set aside and vacated, and the attorney fees claim
against Tolman should be dismissed. Alternatively, the special verdict and judgment
should be set aside and vacated, and the matter should be remanded to the trial court with
instructions to reconsider the attorney fee issue under circumstances in which the finder
of fact is correctly advised as to the legal concepts and standards to be applied in
resolving that issue.

Jjr day of
of May
I
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \ Jt
1995.

CLYDE JSNOW & SWENSON, P.C.

— ^

Gary br Paxton,

i
Susannah E. Kesler
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Tolman
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant
Tolman was served this \_4_ day of May 1995 to Defendant/Appellee's counsel by U.S.
first class mail, postage prepaid:
Jeffrey C. Wilcox, Esq.
Gallian, Westfall, Wilcox & Wright
First Security Bank Building
One South Main Street
P.O. Box 367
St. George, Utah 84771
Attorneys for Defendant, Appellee
and Cross-Appellant

G^ry L. Paxton
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ADDENDUM 1

,3 SEP 3 ?7\ 4 11

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

R.C. TOLMAN, an individual,
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, and LAVA BLUFF
WATER COMPANY, INC., a Utah
corporation,

SPECIAL VERDICT OP THE JURY

Plaintiffs,
vs
Civil No. 900503383

WINCHESTER HILLS WATER COMPANY,
INC., and JOHN DOES I through
V,

Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendants.

We, the jury empaneled in the above-referenced case, find the
issues of fact and answer the special interrogatories to us as
follows:
1.

(a)

Prior

to May

1,

1989, did

Winchester

Hills Water

Company authorize R. C. Tolman to use water from the
Winchester Hills Water £/SLam to water Mr. Tolman's
pasture without paying ior it?
Yes
(b)

(If you answered

.

_

i&t
ft
^toe- to the

No

X

question immediately

3do not answer this question. -=trfb) )

9ft

above,

2.

What is the amount of damage R. C. Tolman should pay for
the use of water on Mr. Tolman's pasture prior to May 1,1989?
,

3.

QO

What is the amount of damages R. C. Tolman should pay for the
use of water on Mr. Tolman's pasture after May 1, 1989?

',2504.

(a) Prior to May 1, 1989, did Winchester Hills Water Company

authorize R. C. Tolman to use water from the unmetered 1 1/2 inch
line to the shop without paying for it?
Yes

No

(b)(If you answered Yes to the question immediately above,do
not answer this question. 4 (b)).
What is the amount of damages R. C. Tolman should pay for the
use of water from the unmetered line to Mr. Tolman's shop before
<4f

May 1, 1989?

2

rn

What is the amount of damages R. C. Tolman should pay for the
use of water from the unmetered line to Mr. Tolman's shop
after May 1, 1989?

'55 ^
What is the amount of damages R. C. Tolman should pay for the
use of water lost because of the leak at the Lava Bluff
System?

w

Z50

OO

Is R. C. Tolman responsible to pay a reasonable Attorney Fee
to Winchester Hills Water Company because of a Breach of
Fiduciary^because of the 1/3 division of the water system?

Yes

X

No

3

Is R. C. Tolman responsible to pay a reasonable Attorney Fee
to Winchester Hills Water Company for Breach of Fiduciary
Duty by signing the Deed for 125 acre feet of water on April
19, 1989?
Yes

x

DATED t h i s

No

^)Z-

day of

gtepWJoejT

JURY FOREPERSON
CONCURRING JURORS:

MfWialiTcL.OTfcX±21&

^£<u£4uC&>V^
f

jVi/^nm/^ f^uthwtffr^-J

v

<^%^L—-~
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ADDENDUM 2

JEFFREY C. WILCOX (4441)
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT
One South Main Street
First Security Bank Building
Post Office Box 367
St- George, Utah 84771
Telephone: (801) 628-1682
Attorneys for Defendant Winchester Hills
Water Company, Inc.

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

R.C. TOLMAN, an individual,
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, and LAVA BLUFF
WATER COMPANY, INC., a Utah
corporation,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
WINCHESTER HILLS WATER COMPANY,
INC., and JOHN DOES I through

Civil No. 900503383
Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came on for jury trial on Monday,
August 30, 1993.

Trial was had on Plaintiff's claims against

Defendants and the Defendant's counterclaims as to Plaintiffs.

On

Wednesday, September 1, 1993, at the close of Plaintiffs' case,
Defendant moved for a directed verdict. After argument by counsel,
the Court granted Defendant's Motion.

On Thursday, September 2,

1993, at the close of Defendant's counterclaim case, Plaintiff
moved for a directed verdict.

After argument from counsel, the

Court granted a partial directed verdict in favor of Plaintiff, and
V

allowed the remaining issues to be decided by the jury.

The jury

rendered a special verdict on September 3, 1993.
Based upon the evidence presented, motions and argument of
counsel,

the Court

issues

the following

Findings

of Fact,

Conclusions of Law as to the directed verdicts issued by the Court,
and further enters Judgment on the jury's verdict.
DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT
AS TO PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
GENERAL STATEMENT OF PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIMS
Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants in this matter on
December 7, 1990. Said suit contained eight separate causes of
action. Because of stipulations between the parties and/or partial
summary judgments entered by the Court previous to trial, only two
of Plaintiffs' causes of action came to trial.

In the first cause

of action, Plaintiff Lava Bluffs Water Company ("Lava Bluffs")
sought compensation from Defendant Winchester Hills Water Company
("WHWC") for the loss of the use of one-third of the Winchester
Hills water system.

In the third cause of action, Lava Bluffs

sought damages from WHWC because WHWC allegedly prohibited Lava
Bluffs from conducting business in the Winchester Hills area.
FINDINGS OF FACT: PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
1.

Plaintiff Lava Bluffs, holds bare legal title to an

undivided one-third of the Winchester Hills water system located in
Winchester Hills Subdivision Phases I and II.
2.

WHWC owns an undivided two-thirds interest in said water

system.
3.

Plaintiffs presented no evidence as to the value of the
2

* 0*
one-third of the water system which Lava Bluffs holds bare legal
title ar.
4. Plaintiffs presented no evidence as to the amount of money
Lava Bluffs claimed WHWC owed to Lava Bluffs for WHWC's use of the
one-third of the water system.
5.

Plaintiffs presented no evidence as to the monetary

damages suffered by Lava Bluffs as a result of WHWC's activities
prohibiting Lava Bluffs from conducting business in the Winchester
Hills area.
6.

The January 19, 1989 Agreement is binding on Eaglebrook

Corporation and on WHWC.

The January 19, 1989 Agreement stated

that Plaintiffs would hold the one-third interest in the water
company until Plaintiffs developed additional property in the
Winchester Hills area.

At the time of such development, the one-

third interest held by Plaintiffs would be transferred back to WHWC
pursuant to the terms of the January 19, 1989 Agreement.
7.

Nowhere in the January 19, 1989 Agreement was there

language entitling Plaintiffs to receive compensation from WHWC for
use of the system.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the above Findings of Fact, the Court issues the
following Conclusions of Law:
1.

Plaintiff Lava Bluffs, must put on a prima facie case as

to every element of its claims.
2.

Plaintiff Lava Bluffs, claimed money damages for the loss

of its use of the one-third interest in the Winchester Hills water
3

system.
3.

Plaintiff Lava Bluffs, failed to present any evidence

regarding the value of its • one-third interest in the water system
nor did it present any evidence as to the amount of damages it was
claiming.
4.

Plaintiff Lava Bluffs, has failed to make a prima facie

case for the jury's consideration.
5.

Furthermore, the January 19, 1989 Agreement does not

entitle Plaintiffs to seek monetary compensation from WHWC for the
use of Plaintiffs' one-third bare legal title interest in the water
system.
6. A directed verdict should be entered in favor of Defendant
holding that Plaintiffs' claims are dismissed with prejudice.
PARTIAL DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF
PLAINTIFF AS AGAINST DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS
GENERAL STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS
WHWC

counterclaimed

against

Plaintiffs

claiming

that

Plaintiffs obtained legal title to one-third of the water system by
breaching fiduciary duties owed by R.C. Tolman to WHWC.

WHWC

sought return of the one-third interest from Plaintiffs. WHWC also
sought attorney's fees from Mr. Tolman based upon his alleged
breach of fiduciary duties.
WHWC further sought delivery of 25 acre feet of water from
R.C. Tolman pursuant to the terms of the February

25, 1989

Agreement. WHWC also sought compensation for various uses of water
by R.C. Tolman.
At the end of Defendant's Counterclaim case, the parties
4

stipulated

that

R.C.

Tolman

is

obligated

to

pay

a

$100.00

assessment and a $300.00 assessment to WHWC.
Furthermore, during the course of Defendant's counterclaim
case, Plaintiffs raised statute of limitations issues. • Based upon
said issues, WHWC stipulated to not seek compensation damages for
many of its originally claimed damages.
As to those issues that the Court grant a directed verdict,
the Court enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Defendant's Counterclaim issues:
1. Bare legal title to an undivided one-third interest in the
Winchester

Hills water

system was

transferred

from

SIDCO to

Eaglebrook Corporation ("Eaglebrook") according to the terms of the
February 25, 1989 Agreement.
2.

Eaglebrook held the undivided one-third interest in the

Water Company pursuant to the terms of the January 19, 1989
Agreement, which Agreement is binding and enforceable between
Eaglebrook Corporation and WHWC.
3.

Pursuant to the plain

language of said Agreements,

Eaglebrook was to hold bare legal title to one-third of the water
system until such time as it developed additional property in the
Winchester Hills area. At the time of said development, Eaglebrook
would return the one-third interest pursuant to the terms of the
Agreements.
4.

Eaglebrook later transferred that one-third undivided

interest" in the water system to Lava Bluffs.
5

jjSt

5. WHWC agreed to be bound by the January 19, 1989 Agreement.
Pursuant to the January 19, 1989 Agreement, WHWC agreed that it
owned sufficient water to service Phases I and II in the Winchester
Hills area.
Based on the above Findings of Fact, the Court issues the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Defendant's Counterclaim issues:
1.

Lava Bluff holds bare legal title to an undivided one-

third interest in the Winchester Hills water system pursuant to the
terms of the February 25, 1989, and January 19, 1989 Agreements.
2.

Lava Bluffs must return the one-third interest in said

water system to Eaglebrook.

The Court impresses a constructive

trust upon the one-third interest held by Eaglebrook Corporation.
Eaglebrook will hold that one-third interest in constructive trust
for WHWC according to the terms of the January 19, 1989 Agreement.
3.

WHWC holds equitable title to the undivided one-third

interest in the water system as limited by the January 19, 1989
Agreement.
4. As of December 31, 1988, there was no water shortfall owed
to WHWC by any of the Plaintiffs.
5. Pursuant to the January 19, 1989 Agreement, WHWC is bound
by the statement therein that there is sufficient water to service
Phases I and II.
6.
water

While WHWC may have a claim against SIDCO for additional

rights, the

Court

concludes
6

/Jar

that

R.C.

Tolman

has

no

contractual liability to provide 25 acre feet of water to WHWC.
WHEREFORE, pursuant

to the above Findings

of Facts and

Conclusions of Law, Judgment should be entered against Defendant
and in favor of Plaintiff as set forth above.
SPECIAL JURY VERDICT
On September 3, 1993, the jury returned a unanimous special
verdict on WHWC's remaining Counterclaim issues.

A copy of the

Special Jury Verdict is attached as Exhibit "A" and incorporated
herein by reference.
Wherefore, pursuant

to

the

above

Findings

of

Fact and

Conclusions of Law and the Special Jury Verdict issued in this case
on September 2, 1993, and for good cause appearing, the Court
enters judgment as follows:
JUDGMENT
1.

Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant are dismissed with

prejudice.
2.

Judgment is entered pursuant to stipulation against

Counterclaim Defendant R.C. Tolman for the $100.00 assessment and
a $300.00 assessment in favor of WHWC.
3. Counterclaim Defendant Lava Bluffs is to immediately turn
over its bare legal title to one-third interest in the water system
to Eaglebrook.
4. The Court imposes a constructive trust upon said undivided
one-third interest in the water system.

Eaglebrook will hold said

one-third interest in constructive trust for the sole purpose of
turning

said one-third

interest
7

over to WHWC when, and if,

Eaglebrook develops further property in the Winchester Hills area
pursuant to those portions of the February 25, 1989, and January
19, 1989 Agreements that deal with return of the one-third interest
in the Water Company,

Said constructive trust imposes no duties

upon WHWC to pay for the use of the system while it is held by
Eaglebrook.
5.

WHWC's claims against Counterclaim Defendant R.C. Tolman

for 25 acre feet of water or any shortfall in water are hereby
dismissed with prejudice.
6.

Judgment is entered against R.C. Tolman for the use of

water on Mr. Tolman's pasture prior to May 1, 1989, in the amount
of $5,500.00.
7.

Judgment is entered against R.C. Tolman for the use of

water on Mr. Tolman's pasture after May 1, 1989, in the amount of
$250.00.
8.

Judgment is entered against R.C. Tolman for use of water

from the unmetered line to Mr. Tolman's shop before May 1, 1989, in
the amount of $262.50.
9.

Judgment is entered against R.C. Tolman for use of water

from the unmetered line to Mr. Tolman's shop after May 1, 1989, in
the amount of $55.00.
10.

Judgment is entered against R.C. Tolman for the use of

water loss because of the leak at the Lava Bluff system in the
amount of $250.00.
11. Judgment is entered against R.C. Tolman to pay reasonable
attorney's fees incurred by WHWC in defending claims brought by
8

Lava Bluffs Water Company because of Mr. Tolman's breach of
fiduciary duties whereby he allowed his corporation, Eaglebrook, to
obtain an undivided one-third interest in the water system.
12.

Judgment is entered

against R.C. Tolman to pay a

reasonable attorney's fees incurred by WHWC in a previous lawsuit
against Arlene Tolman to quiet title to 125 acre feet of water
transferred by R.C. Tolman to himself and his wife in breach of
R.C. Tolman's fiduciary duties to WHWC.
13.

WHWC is to submit affidavits with regards to its claims

for attorney's fees on or before October 11, 1989.
14.

All other claims pled, presented or alleged in this

action by WHWC against R.C. Tolman are dismissed with prejudice.
15.

Interest to accrue on said judgment at the rate allowed

by law.
DATED this

*s

day of Son^gfeer, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

JUDGEMENT ENTERED
Time:

AlXZ&m

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

R.C. TOLMAN, an individual,
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, and LAVA BLUFF
WATER COMPANY, INC., a Utah
corporation,

SPECIAL VERDICT OF THE JURY

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. 900503383

WINCHESTER HILLS WATER COMPANY,
INC., and JOHN DOES I through
V,

Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendants.

We, the jury empaneled in the above-referenced case, find the
issues of fact and answer the special interrogatories to us as
follows:
1.

(a)

Prior

to

May

1,

1989, did

Winchester

Hills

Water

Company authorize R. C. Tolman to use water from the
Winchester Hills Water S^scem to water Mr. Tolman's
pasture without paying for it?
Yes
(b)

(If you answered

. _

_w

Z?
at
Itoe- t o t h e
i-

No

question immediately

9ft

do not answer this question. «l-frb) )

/3b3

x
above,

2.

What is the amount of damage R. C. Tolman should pay for
the use of water on Mr. Tolman's pasture prior to May 1,1989?

5,500
3.

What is the amount of damages R. C. Tolman should pay for the
use of water on Mr. Tolman's pasture after May 1, 1989?

f

Z5D

4.

(a) Prior to May 1, 1989, did Winchester Hills Water Company

authorize R. C. Tolman to use water from the unmetered 1 1/2 inch
line to the shop without paying for it?
v.
Yes

No

(b)(If you answered Yes to the question immediately above,do
not answer this question. 4 (b)).
What is the amount of damages R. C. Tolman should pay for the
use of water from the unmetered line to Mr. Tolman's shop before
May 1 ,

1989?

ZUlM

I3#/

What is the amount of damages R. C. Tolman should pay for the
use of water from the unmetered line to Mr. Tolman's shop
after May 1, 1989?

'55^
What is the amount of damages R. C. Tolman should pay for the
use of water lost because of the leak at the Lava Bluff

System?

w

Z50

OO

Is R. C. Tolman responsible to pay a reasonable Attorney Fee
to Winchester Hills Water Company because of a Breach of
Fiduciary^because of the 1/3 division of the water system?
Yes

A

No

r -7 ' c

8.

Is R. C. Tolman responsible to pay a reasonable Attorney Fee
to Winchester Hills Water Company for Breach of Fiduciary
Duty by signing the Deed for 125 acre feet of water on April
19, 1989?

Yes

A

No

3~

DATED this

day of ^)ememloe.r , i9_35_.
JURY FOREPERSON

CONCURRING JURORS:

QJUfon/Ht

£\jdlsv{tf&r^J

^^^L^—

/ 1J
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ADDENDUM 3

JEFFREY C. WILCOX (4441)
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT
One South Main Street
First Security Bank Building
Post Office Box 367
St. George, Utah 84771
Telephone: (801) 628-1682
Attorneys for Defendant Winchester Hills
Water Company/ Inc.

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

R.C. TOLMAN, an individual,
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, and LAVA BLUFF
WATER COMPANY, INC., a Utah
corporation,

JUDGMENT AND AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES

Plaintiffs,
vs,
WINCHESTER HILLS WATER COMPANY,
INC., and JOHN DOES I through
V,

Civil No. 900503383
Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendants.

On October 5, 1993, this Court entered Judgment pursuant to a
Special Verdict of the Jury dated September 3, 1993. Paragraphs 11
and 12 of said Judgment read as follows:
(11) Judgment is entered against R. C. Tolman to pay
reasonable attorney's fees incurred by WHWC in defending
claims brought by Lava Bluffs Water Company because of
Mr. Tolman's breach of fiduciary duties whereby he
allowed his corporation, Eaglebrook, to obtain an
undivided one-third interest in the water system.
(12) Judgment is entered against R. C. Tolman to pay a
reasonable attorney's fee incurred by WHWC in a previous
lawsuit against Arlene Tolman to guiet title to 125 acre
feet of water transferred to R. C. Tolman to himself and

his wife in breach of R. C. Tolman's fiduciary duties to
WHWC.
Pursuant to paragraphs 11 and 12 of said Judgment, this Court
held an evidentiary hearing on February 28, 1994, and again on
March 4, 1994, as regards to WHWC's application for reasonable
attorney's

fees.

Pursuant

to

that

hearing, WHWC

presented

testimony of David W. West, Esq., Matthew F. Hilton, Esq., and
Jeffrey C. Wilcox, Esq., the attorneys who represented WHWC during
the pertinent times of the litigation.

Each attorney presented

billing statements or pre-billing ledgers breaking out the work
they claimed

should be appropriately billed to R. C. Tolman

pursuant to the October 5, 1993 Judgment.

Said statements and

billing ledgers were admitted into evidence as Exhibits 1 through
3,
By Stipulation of the parties prior to the hearing, the hourly
rates charged by Mr. West, Mr. Hilton and Mr. Wilcox were not an
issue.
At the end of the evidentiary hearing on March 4, 1994, the
Court issued its ruling from the bench.

A copy of the transcript

containing the Court's ruling is attached as Exhibit
incorporated by reference.

"A" and

Pursuant to the Court's request, said

Exhibit "A" is in lieu of findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Pursuant to the evidence presented, and the analysis of the
Court, Judgment

is hereby

entered

against Mr. R.

C. Tolman

personally as follows:
1.

As to the litigation between WHWC v. R.C. Tolman and

Arlene Tolman, to quiet title to 125 acre feet of water as set
2

forth in paragraph

12 of the Judgment, the Court awards no

attorney's fees for the reasons set forth in Exhibit "A".
2-

As to the award of attorney's fees incurred by WHWC in

defending claims brought by Lava Bluffs Water Company, the Court
awards none of the fees requested by Matthew F. Hilton.

The

reasons that the Court awards WHWC none of Mr. Hilton's fees is set
forth in Exhibit "A" attached hereto.

As to the fees claimed by

Mr. Wilcox, the Court awards judgment in favor of WHWC and as
against Mr. R. C. Tolman in the amount of $23,428.00
3.

The Court awards court costs to WHWC which was the

prevailing party in the total amount of $4,232.75. Said costs are
fully described and set forth in Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
4.

Interest on the Judgment and Costs will run at the post-

judgment rate as specified by statute.
DATED this

< j ^—

day of April, 1994. „ . ~ * .
BY THE COURT:
*.*S2£\

J./Philip Eve
District Courf JugctgQ^--:
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

^

/ *-

,—

j>*

/

Clifford/V. Dunn
^torney for Plaintiffs

ey C/ flllcox
ney / t o r Defendant WHWC

IlnilivJ
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
HON. J. PHILIP EVES, judge

R.C. TOLMAN, an individual,
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, and LAVA BLUFF
WATER COMPANY, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 900503383

WINCHESTER HILLS WATER
COMPANY, INC., and
JOHN DOES I through V,
Defendants.

_______

(Judged Ruling Only)
* * *

REPORTERS HEARING TRANSCRIPT
Friday, March 4, 1994
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL:
For the Plaintiffs:

CLIFFORD V. DUNN, ESQ.
170 North 400 East
Suite 9
St. George, Utah 84770

For the Defendants:

GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT
BY: JEFFREY C. WILCOX, ESQ.
One South Main Street
St. George, Utah 84770

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
P.O. BOX 1534
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770

EXHIBIT

A

2
ST. GEORGE, UTAH; FRIDAY, MARCH 4, 1994
-oOo-

THE COURT: We're back in session.

It's

one o'clock.
Is Mr. Tolman going to join us?
MR. DUNN:

He said he would, but I haven't seen

THE COURT:

Well, we'll proceed in his absence,

him.

if that's all right.
MR. DUNN:

That's fine.

THE COURT:
with their counsel.

All right.

The parties are present

Except that we'll note the absence of

Mr. Tolman.
The Court has spent the last two hours in —

in

considering the proof that's been presented in this case.
And before I begin to announce my decision, I would like to
set out the legal framework upon which the Court is going
to hang the facts as they've been presented here to reach
the decision.
Let me first state that the —
American rule on attorney's fees.

there is an

And generally in this

country, when one becomes involved in a lawsuit, one is
obligated to pay his or her own attorney's fees.
exceptions to that rule.

There are

The first of those is where

3
there's an agreement that shifts the burden of attorney's
fees to a breaching party in the agreement.

The second is

where there's a statute passed by the legislature that
shifts that burden of attorney's fees to another party
other than the one who incurred the fees.

And by recent

decision, there is now what is called a third-party
attorney fee rule, which is the one that applies in this
case, which appears to provide that in circumstances where
there is a breach of contract or a tort which causes
consequential damages, it is possible under that rule to
shift the burden of attorney's fees to the person who
breached the contract or committed the tort, so long as it
falls within certain broad guidelines which I'm now going
to discuss.
The Court is well aware of the Dixie State Bank
versus Bracken case.
cases.

I've applied that in many previous

In reviewing that case, I've identified as many as

15 or 20 factors that the Court of Appeals has suggested
the Court consider in deciding a reasonable attorney's
fee.

I hasten to add that that case was decided not in a

third-party tort or contract breach situation, but it was
a —

a situation where the Court was being called upon to

determine a reasonable attorney's fee under a —
contract.

a

That differs from our circumstance here.

Court's duty in this case is not to determine what a
U/Ll

The

4
reasonable attorney's fee is. Obviously, the very concept
of a reasonable attorney's fee vests this court with broad
discretion in deciding whether an attorney's fee that's
being claimed is within the bounds of reason.

And the

Court can use its own judgment, it's own knowledge of the
case and the attorneys and so forth in deciding what's
reasonable.

This is not such a case.

This is a case where

as an item of damages, the claiming party, Winchester Hills
Water Company, must demonstrate that they've actually
suffered a loss.

And the burden of proof is on Winchester

Hills Water Company.

They must prove their loss by a

preponderance of the evidence.

So it's a totally different

concept than a reasonable attorney fee, to that extent.
I have looked at the Dixie State Bank versus
Bracken case, and I've considered the factors laid out
there.

They have some application to this case in that the

Court still is required, I believe, to make an analysis as
to whether the claimed attorney's fees are unreasonably
large; whether they've been —
billing.

there's been double

There's been billing in excess of the normal rate

in this area.
I don't find that any of those factors really
come into play in this case.

It would appear to me that

nothing that has been claimed by Winchester Hills Water
Company in this case would in any way violate the concepts

5
set out under Dixie State Bank versus Bracken.

There isn't

even a challenge as to the reasonableness of the fees or
the hours actually spent which generated those fees.

The

issue in this case is to what did those fees relate.
And that brings us, of course, to the South
Sanpitch case and the rule of law established there.

Under

that South Sanpitch case, the only fees which the
Winchester Hills Water Company may claim as damages are
those fees attributable to litigation with third parties as
a result of the actions of Mr. Tolman.
claims —

The party or party

parties claiming the damages must prove the

damages as a preponderance of the evidence, as I've said,
and they can only be awarded where it's reasonably
foreseeable that the tort-feasor's conduct would result in
attorney's fees being incurred by the claimant, the water
company, and the fees must have a causal connection to the
act of the tort-feasor.
Now, that rule does not contemplate that the
claimant can recover fees that are incurred or were
reasonably necessary as related to the tort-feasor
himself.

In other words, the Court must separate out the

fees generated in litigation with Mr. Tolman versus fees
generated in litigation with a third party or individual.
In this case, at the time of trial, the jury was
asked to find on two specific questions.

The first was

6
whether or not Winchester Hills Water Company was entitled
to recoup its attorney's fees as consequential damages
because the jury had found that Mr. Tolman had breached his
fiduciary duty by dividing up the water distribution system
into thirds and then transferring one-third of that system
to the Lava Bluff Water Company.

We've been referring to

those as the Lava Bluff claims.
The second area was whether or not Winchester
Hills Water Company would be entitled to recoup its
attorney7s fees because it had found that Mr. Tolman had
breached his fiduciary duty by deeding 125 acre feet of
water right from the Winchester Hills Water Company to
himself and his wife Arleen Tolman.
In the first case, then, the claimant,
Winchester Hills Water Company, is entitled to collect as
consequential damages the attorney's fees incurred in
resolving the claims of Lava Bluffs Water Company, since it
was reasonably foreseeable that such fees would be
necessary to recover the one-third interest in the water
distribution system in the event that it was determined
that that was improperly taken from Winchester Hills Water
Company.
In the second case, the claimant, Winchester
Hills Water Company, is entitled to collect as
consequential damages attorney's fees incurred in

\CI<)
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recovering title to the 125 acre feet of water from Arleen
Tolman, but not fees incurred in recovering the same water
right from R.C. Tolman.
Let's deal with the first of the —

of these

questions.

It appears to be the easier.

question —

well, let's first deal with the second

question.

And that's the

That's the question of the 125 acre feet of

water right.
In these proceedings today, Mr. West has
testified correctly that it was necessary to sue both
Mr. and Mrs. Tolman to clear title to the water right.

He

has also frankly admitted that although Mrs. Tolman was a
nominal defendant in that action, she took no active role.
No fees were incurred in pursuing the action against her
except those incurred in pursuing the action against
Mr. Tolman.
Under these circumstances, the law is clear.
Those fees incurred in pursuing Mr. Tolman may not be
awarded as consequential damages.

The fees charged by

Mr. West clearly were incurred in litigation with
Mr. Tolman and not with Mrs. Tolman.
incidental, at best.

Her involvement was

Therefore, under the third-party

attorney fee rule, no fees are awardable as consequential
damages in that action, since there's been no showing that
Mrs. Tolman's participation or lack of participation caused

-*' / J
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Winchester Hills Water Company to incur any fees beyond
those necessary to defeat Mr. Tolman's claims.
The Court declines to award as consequential
damages any part of the $6,324 in fees which were paid to
Mr. West by Winchester Hills Water Company for the reason
that they are not consequential damages assignable to
Mrs. Tolman versus Mr. Tolman.
Now let's turn to the more complex matter, and
that's the question of the Lava Bluff claims.

The Court

has before it oral testimony from Mr. Wilcox and
Mr. Hilton, as well as Exhibits 2 and 3.

Those are the

evidentiary foundation upon which the Court must determine
the amount of attorney's fees attributable to the
litigation over the Lava Bluff claims.
Mr. Wilcox, in his testimony and Affidavit, has
rendered a careful accounting of the portions of his
billings to his clients which in his opinion are directly
attributable to the litigation over the claims of Lava
Bluffs.

He claims that because of the complex nature of

the suit, the novelty and originality of many of the issues
and the number of issues, the frequency of court
appearances and so forth, it was reasonably necessary that
he spend the time that he did.
right to be —

And he has claimed the

to have Winchester Hills Water Company

reimbursed for 452.5 hours which he spent himself on the

9
case at $90 an hour, 19.05 hours which Mr. Jonathan Wright
spent on the case at $90 an hour; one hour which
Mr. Gallian —

Russell Gallian spent on the case at $110 an

hour, and one and a half hours spent by one Robin Spencer,
who apparently is not an attorney but for which Winchester
Hills Water Company was billed $75 an hour.
claim that that firm has —

The total

has advanced is $42,662.

Mr. Wilcox admitted, however, during his
testimony, that his bill —

billing claim should probably

be reduced by 10 to 15 hours for the time spent on breach
of contract claims which are unrelated to the breach of
fiduciary duty towards —

found by the jury.

In addition,

the client was not billed for eight hours of time claimed,
and, therefore, never incurred those damages.
So if I apply those reductions, which total
$2,125 —

that is 15 hours at $90 an hour and then eight

hours at $90 an hour.

The total reduction is 2,125 —

the

remaining claim by the Gallian, Westfall, Wilcox & Wright
firm is $40,537.
The Court has also reviewed its own files in
this matter and the documents received in evidence in this
case.

The Court notes that at the time this matter went to

trial and during the pre-trial preparation period, there
was a counterclaim on file, filed by Winchester Hills Water
Company.

There were five claims in that counterclaim.

The

10
first of those alleged breach of fiduciary duty by
Mr. Tolman; the second alleged breach of contract by all
three plaintiffs; the third alleged unjust enrichment
against Mr. Tolman; the fourth sought return of the 25 acre
feet of water from the plaintiffs —

from a claimed

mathematical miscalculation unrelated to the breaches of
fiduciary duty found by the jury, and the fifth sought
declaratory relief against the plaintiffs jointly,
restraining them from various activities which would
interfere with Winchester Hills Water —
operation or impair the service —

Water Company's

their service or their

system.
The latter count was directed against Lava
Bluffs.

However, as the Court recalls, it was not

litigated, and, in fact, I can't find anywhere in the
judgment where it even was mentioned that there was to be a
restraining order.

The Court did impose a constructive

trust on one-third of the water system held by Lava Bluff
and ordered that —

that the title to that system be

returned to Eaglebrook to be held under the —

under that

trust pursuant to the agreements between the parties.

But

clearly, all of the counterclaim counts did not involve
Lava Bluffs.

Only those fees attributable to litigation

with Lava Bluffs can be called consequential damages.

So

the Court has turned to Exhibit 3 in an effort to determine

11
from the documentation submitted by counsel for Winchester
Hills Water Company exactly which of the hours set out in
the pre-billing ledgers which Mr. Wilcox has submitted in
support of his claim should be attributed to the litigation
between Winchester Hills Water Company and Lava Bluffs.
The Court has gone through those pre-billing
ledgers and circled in red ink the hours that it thinks
are —

can be shown to be attributable —

attributable to that litigation.
by page.

that it finds are

And I've done that page

Basically, what I have done is this, and the

award I'm going to make is as follows.
For June of 1992, I find that there were 16
hours at $90 an hour or $1,440 attributable to that
litigation.

For the next page, which is titled June and

part of July, 1992, I find that four hours at $90 an hour
are attributable, $360.
attributable.

For August, I find no hours

For September, 1992, I find two hours

attributable at $90 an hour, $180.
find no hours attributable.

For November, 1992, I find 4.5

hours at $90 an hour or $405.
hours at $90 an hour, $405.

For October, 1992, I

For December, 1992, 4.5
For January, 1993, I find 1.5

hours at $90 an hour for $135.

For February, 1993, I find

16.75 hours at $90 an hour for $1,507.50.
I find 21 hours at $90 an hour for $1,890.

For March, 1993,
For April,

1993, I find 16 hours at $90 an hour for $1,440.

For May

12
of 1993, I find two hours at $90 an hour for $180. For
June of 1993, I find nine hours at $90 an hour for $810.
For July of 1993, I find three hours at $90 an hour for
$270.

For August, 1993, I find 127.25 hours at $90 an hour

for a total of $11,452.50.

For September, 1993, I find

32.7 hours at $90 an hour for a total of $2,943.
So the total attorney's fees that the Court
could determine are clearly attributable to the litigation
with Lava Bluffs Water Company from the exhibits and
testimony presented is $23,428.
Now, with regard to Mr. Hilton's fees, the Court
has followed the same process in trying to —

to determine

which of Mr. Hilton's fees are clearly attributable to the
litigation with Lava Bluffs Water Company.

Mr. Hilton's

statements which he submitted to Winchester Hills Water
Company and which were paid do not break out the hours that
he thinks are attributable to the Winchester Hills Water
Company, as do the —

the statements submitted by

Mr. Wilcox.
Let me just pause here to point out that this is
a relatively new rule in the law.

This issue of

attributing attorney's fees to a third-party.

It's

undoubtedly going to lead to some changes in keeping
billing notes by the attorneys, but the Court does not lay
any fault at Mr. Hilton's feet for not keeping more

3£'Sl 3
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adequate records and more complete records of what his time
was spent on, because it's a relatively new area of law,
and probably he was not aware that he was going to be
called upon two or three years later to try to recount how
he spent his time.
But as I go through his billing statement, I
find several things.

First of all, each of those

statements contains very brief mention —

for example,

conference with Cliff Dunn or a phone conference with Norm
Laub —

things like that, that tell me nothing about what

the content of those conversations was or would have been.
In addition, Mr. Hilton, when he was pressed on
several of those notations, was unable to recreate what has
caused that entry, because obviously it's been a long time,
and he does not remember what he was doing on a particular
day when he made a 15-minute phone call.

It's not hard to

understand, but it places the Court in a position of trying
to determine whether or not it can award any of
Mr. Hilton's fees, in view of the fact that he can't tell
me how they were incurred.

Whether they should be applied

to the Lava Bluff litigation, or whether they should be
applied to Mr. Tolman or Eaglebrook or some other portion
of this lawsuit.
Mr. Hilton, as you will recall, took a two-hour
recess and went out and tried to recreate from his memory

4fc?v
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what these —

these entries applied to.

And he came back

and told us that his best estimate was that about 75
percent of these fees were applied to the Lava Bluff
litigation, and about 25 percent were not.
In view of Mr. Hilton's obvious lack of memory
as to what happened on any of these given dates, the Court
finds that estimate unconvincing.

The Court finds that

Winchester Hills Water Company has failed in its burden of
proof regarding Mr. Hilton's fees for services rendered.
The Court is unable to determine either from the testimony
presented or the documentary evidence before it what amount
of Mr. Hilton's fees should be applied to the Lava Bluffs
litigation.

And in order to do that, the Court would have

to speculate as to what the amount of the fees would be,
and the Court declines to do that.
Now, this is where the difference between a
reasonable attorney fee and damages comes in.
said that there is a difference.

I previously

And this is it.

were affixing a reasonable attorney fee —

If I

if there's a

contract situation, or if it were a situation where the law
required that the Court impose a reasonable attorney's fee,
I would be willing, based on these statements; based on the
complexity of the case to determine what a reasonable
attorney's fee is.
in court a lot.

I mean I've practiced law.

I've been

I know what a reasonable attorney's fee

^LL
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is.

But I don't have that prerogative, as I view the law

in this case.

This is a matter of damage proof.

And I

find that the proof is inadequate to allow the Court to
make any reasonable determination as to what Mr. Hilton's
time was spent on, and therefore, the Court cannot award as
damages any part of Mr. Hilton's fees.
Now turning to the issue of costs.

These costs

are awarded to the prevailing party, they're not awarded
under the South Sanpitch rationale.

So the Court is going

to award costs which are generally awarded to the
prevailing party in a lawsuit, and that differs from
attorney's fees.
The Court is going to award the —
claimed by Mr. Wilcox.
me this morning.

the costs

And those I think you ran down for

And all of those were reasonable and

proper costs of the lawsuit.
With regard to those costs which Mr. Hilton has
identified in his statements —
out-of-pocket expenses —

and he calls them

I'm going to go through those and

state which of the costs are awardable and which are not,
in this Court's view.
The first statement which contains the
out-of-pocket expenses is the statement of March 20th,
1992.

And on the last page, there are several out of

pocket expenses listed, including fax, copies and postage.
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None of those is a proper cost of litigation, and those
first three items on that page are not awarded.

However,

recording fees and copies of discovery documents are
awardable, and so I'm going to award $207 on that page as
costs.
The next costs list appears on the April 10th,
1992 statement on the fifth page.

Again there are several

out-of-pocket expenses listed there, including fax costs
and postage costs and so forth.
awardable.

The fax costs are not

The postage costs are not awardable.

I am

going to award the $50 jury demand, the $227.95 for actual
copies made, the recording fee of $7 and $200 again
forwarded for discovery copying to Mr. Dunn.
add that up, but whatever that adds up to.

And I did not
50 plus 227.95

plus seven plus 200.
The next list of costs appears on the May 1st,
1992 statement.

And again, there's a lot of out-of-pocket

expenses listed there.

But the ones that are awardable are

the $75 filing fee, the $30 service fee, the $17 witness
fee and the $1,524.25 for deposition copies.

The others

are declined.
The next list appears on June 10th, 1992.
the .out-of-pocket expenses listed there —

And

the only one

that's awardable is the deposition copy costs of $751.75.
MR. DUNN:

751.75?
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THE COURT: Correct.
The next list appears on the June —
10th, 1992 statement.

or July

And there are no out-of-pocket

expenses awardable from that list.

They're all telephone

and fax postage type costs, which are not awardable.
The next list appears on the December 22nd, 1992
statement.

And it consists of several items.

But the one

that is awardable is the publication of the summons in The
Daily Spectrum, $268.

The others are not awarded.

Now, did you keep a list of those costs as I
went through them?
MR. WILCOX:
THE COURT:

I have, Your Honor.
All right.

MR. WILCOX:

I didn't write down exactly which

one it was, but —
MR. DUNN:

I'll check him.

THE COURT:

Well, I have circled each of those

costs that I intended to award on the Exhibit No. 2.
you need to refer to it, it's here.

So if

And I've tabbed each

one of these pages I just referred to with a little yellow
slip.
MR. WILCOX:
THE COURT:
Okay.

Thank you.
Are there any questions?

Mr. Wilcox, will you prepare the

appropriate document for my signature?
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MR. WILCOX:

Will that be Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law?
THE COURT:

Well, I think if you'll get a copy

of this record, that that —

and attach it, that's probably

adequate for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

I

don't think you need to try to rehash all that.
MR. DUNN:

I think it would be preferable to

just use the record.
THE COURT:

I would think so too.

MR. WILCOX:

So have a judgment

THE COURT:

—

That sets out the award of

attorney's fees and costs but attach as Exhibit A this —
this record for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Is that adequate for your purposes?
MR. WILCOX:

Well, again I'm wondering do I —

do you want me to prepare simply a judgment or Findings of
Fact and then a judgment based on those findings?
THE COURT:

No.

I want you to prepare a

judgment but refer in the judgment to Exhibit A for
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

And Exhibit A

will be a copy of this record that we've just made here
this afternoon.
MR. WILCOX:
THE COURT:
MR. DUNN:

Okay.

Good enough.

Is that acceptable to both sides?
That's fine with me, Your Honor.
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1

THE COURT:

2

We're in recess.

3

(Whereupon, the proceedings in the

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Okay.

Well, thank you, Folks.

above-entitled matter were concluded at 1:24 P.M.)
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Reporter in and for the Fifth Judicial District, State of
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That the foregoing matter, to wit, R.C* TOLMAN,
et al. VS. WINCHESTER HILLS WATER COMPANY, et al., CIVIL
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time and place therein named and thereafter reduced to
computerized transcription under my direction.
I further testify that I am not interested in
the event of the action.
WITNESS my hand and seal this 30th day of March,
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

R. C. TOLMAN, an individual,
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, and LAVA BLUFF
WATER COMPANY, INC., a Utah
corporation,

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Plaintiff(s),
vs.
WINCHESTER HILLS WATER COMPANY,
INC., and JOHN DOES I through V,
Defendant(s)

Civil No. 900503383 CV

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
To assist you in performing your function in this case, the Court gives you the
following instructions:

INSTRUCTION NO.

l>

Definitions
The following definitions are given to help you understand the
meanings of the following terms:
1.

Fiduciary. A "fiduciary" is a person with a duty to act

primarily for the benefit of another.
2.

Fiduciary Relationship.

Generally, in a fiduciary

relationship, the property, interest, or authority of a person or
entity is placed in the charge of the fiduciary.
3.
Directors.

Fiduciary

Relationship

of

Corporate

Officers

and

Directors and other officers of a corporation stand in

a fiduciary relation to the corporation.

INSTRUCTION NO.

IT

Directors and officers have a fiduciary duty of loyalty to
their corporation and its stockholders. They are obligated to use
their ingenuity, influence, and energy, and to employ all the
resources of the corporation, to preserve and enhance the property
and earning power of the corporation, even if the interest of the
corporation are in conflict with their own personal interest. This
duty of loyalty extends to all of the corporation's assets.
The duty of the officers of a corporation is to further the
interests in the business of the corporation and to preserve its
property.

Any action of a director looking to impair corporate

rights or sacrifice corporate interests, the retardation of the
objects of the corporation, should be regarded as a breach of trust
on the part of the director engaged therein.
A trustee, in administering the affairs of a corporation, must
exercise ordinary care, skill, and diligence. Under this rule, it
is necessary for a trustee to give the corporation such attention
as an ordinarily discrete businessman would give to his own
concerns under similar circumstances.
In view of the evidence in this case, you should determine if
Mr. Tolman's acts relating to the division of the water system into
thirds constitutes a breach of fiduciary duties to Winchester Hills
Water Company.
Also, an independently, you should determine if Mr. Tolman
breached fiduciary duties to Winchester Hills Water Company by
signing the deed of April 19, 1989, as to the 125 acre feet of
water.

INSTRUCTION NO.

'y

Damages for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
WHWC seeks damages from Mr. Tolman for breach of fiduciary
duties.

The damages sought are the reasonable attorney fees that

it has expended in defending against Lava Bluffs' claims in this
lawsuit.
However,

before

you

can

find

Mr.

Tolman

liable

to

pay

Winchester Hills Water Company's reasonable attorney fees, you must
find:
1.

That Mr. Tolman's breach of fiduciary duty resulted in

Lava Bluffs Water Company suing Winchester Hills Water Company in
this action.
2.

That

Lava

Bluffs

Water

Company's

lawsuit

against

Winchester Hills Water Company was a A foreseeable result of Mr.
Tolman's

breach

of

fiduciary

duty

to

Winchester

Hills

Water

Company.
3.

That Lava Bluffs Water Company was not connected with Mr.

Tolman's original breach of fiduciary duty.
If you find that each of these three (3) elements exist, you
should find that Winchester Hills Water Company is entitled to
reasonable attorney fees from Mr. Tolman. The court
the amount of attorney fees at a later date.

will determine

INSTRUCTION NO.

ip

Damages for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
WHWC seeks damages from Mr. Tolman for breach of fiduciary
duties.

The damages sought are the reasonable attorney .fees that

it has expended in litigation against Mrs. Arlene Tolman regarding
Mr. Tolman's signing the April 19, 1989 Deed regarding the 125 acre
feet of water.
However, before you can

find Mr. Tolman

liable

to pay

Winchester Hills Water Company's reasonable attorney fees, you must
find:
1.

That Mr. Tolman's breach of fiduciary duty resulted in

litigation with Mrs. Arlene Tolman regarding the 125 acre feet of
water.
2.

That the litigation of the 125 acre feet of water with

Mrs. Arlene Tolman was a naturally foreseeable result of Mr.
Tolman's signing the April 19, 1989 Deed.
3.

That Mrs. Arlene Tolman was not connected with Mr.

Tolman's signing the April 19, 1989 Deed.
If you find that each of these three (3) elements exist, you
should find that Winchester Hills Water Company is entitled to
reasonable attorney fees from Mr. Tolman. The court will determine
the amount of attorney fees at a later date.

